Section III. Independent State Enforcement and the Evidentiary Referral Layer
Research date: November 5, 2026. Proposed operating design for the 120th Congress; no committee, prosecutorial office, subpoena, or investigation is created by this publication.
1. The institutional boundary
The hub-and-spoke model gives Congress a disciplined way to identify legislative failures while allowing appropriate state institutions to assess evidence under their own laws. The congressional hub remains responsible for its legislative inquiry. Each attorney general, district attorney, regulator, and court remains responsible for its own jurisdiction and decisions. A congressional referral is information, not a charging order, delegation of federal power, finding of guilt, or substitute for admissible evidence.
A referral sends screened material to an office with its own legal authority. An incoming dossier may justify no action, preservation, a civil inquiry, a regulatory examination, or a criminal investigation. Prosecutors must decide independently. Every referral must disclose exculpatory material, alternative explanations, methodological weaknesses, and restrictions on use alongside the inculpatory hypothesis.
Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 gives the President clemency authority over offenses against the United States; a presidential pardon does not extinguish a state offense. State pardons, immunity agreements, limitations periods, jurisdictional defects, federal defenses, and proof failures can still prevent enforcement. The District of Columbia is a special case: DOJ explains that presidential clemency includes offenses prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney for D.C. in the name of the United States in D.C. Superior Court. D.C. must therefore have a distinct clemency assessment, rather than being treated as a state. [D01]
*Gamble v. United States*, 587 U.S. 678 (2019), preserves the federal dual-sovereignty doctrine. It does not erase more protective state restrictions on successive prosecutions. New York Criminal Procedure Law §§ 40.20–40.51 requires a separate analysis. Section 40.51 creates specified presidential-clemency exceptions requiring a clear-and-convincing showing; it does not permit every state prosecution following every federal pardon. The dossier must identify prior charges, attachments of jeopardy, dispositions, clemency instruments, implicated persons, and the precise applicable exception before making any successive-prosecution prediction. [D02–D03]
2. The jurisdiction and statutory nexus matrix
Use the following matrix to select research questions and a possible receiving office. It supplies screening authorities, not automatic charges. For every row, counsel must verify the law effective on the conduct date, controlling decisions, limitations, territorial jurisdiction, venue, statutory exemptions, and the recipient's own authority. A property, corporate charter, bank branch, or exchange customer in a jurisdiction is a lead to assess. It does not establish all elements.
| Jurisdiction and possible recipient | Primary screening authority and required factual fit | Evidence to obtain independently; principal boundary |
|---|---|---|
| New York Attorney General, securities and civil fraud | General Business Law Article 23-A, especially §§ 352, 352-c, 353; Executive Law § 63(12). Identify a securities/commodities offer or transaction within or from New York, or repeated/persistent fraudulent or illegal business conduct. | Offering statements, investor communications, sales location, transaction counterparties, and the representations actually made. Distinguish statutory civil fraud from intentional common-law fraud and felony offenses. [D04–D06] |
| Manhattan District Attorney or other competent New York prosecutor | Penal Law §§ 460.10, 460.20, enterprise corruption; Criminal Procedure Law §§ 20.20, 20.40, jurisdiction and county venue. Establish the defined enterprise, qualifying pattern, knowledge, intent, and defendant participation. | Conduct and result locations, qualifying predicate acts, dates, and participation proof. Mere routing through CHIPS, Fedwire, or a New York correspondent account is not a stand-alone jurisdictional rule. [D07–D09] |
| Delaware Attorney General; Court of Chancery | Delaware General Corporation Law, 8 Del. C. § 284; Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 6 Del. C. § 18-112. Corporate charter forfeiture and domestic LLC certificate cancellation require the specified misuse/abuse showing and judicial proceedings. | Certified formation/amendment records, entity-specific acts, responsible persons, and use of the corporate form. Registration alone does not prove fraud, beneficial ownership, or personal liability. [D10–D11] |
| California Attorney General, eligible local public prosecutors, DFPI | Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, 17203–17206; Corporations Code § 25401; Financial Code § 3201 and exemptions. Match an unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice; a covered securities misstatement/omission; or regulated digital-asset business with California residents. | Actual customer location, offers, statements, assets, custodial activity, and license/application/exemption evidence. California's DFAL licensing or completed-application trigger began July 1, 2026; activity classification and exemptions remain essential. [D12–D14] |
| Florida State Attorney, Department of Financial Services investigators, competent revenue/licensing bodies | Florida Statutes § 817.234, insurance fraud; § 212.085, fraudulent sales-tax exemption claim. Separate lodging or property tax questions under the precise tax and locality involved. | The allegedly false insurance application/claim, material fact, knowledge/intent, policy, payment and Florida connection; or written exemption certificate and tax-evasion facts. Different valuations are leads, not conclusive fraud. [D15–D16] |
| New Jersey Attorney General, county prosecutor, insurance enforcement | N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4.6, insurance fraud; 2C:21-10, commercial bribery/breach of disinterested duty. Establish material falsity/omission and knowledge for the former, and the covered relationship and prohibited benefit/understanding for the latter. | Signed underwriting submissions, supporting schedules, claim or premium records; procurement agreements, employee duties and payment communications. Statutory role and intent cannot be inferred from a political connection. [D17–D18] |
| Virginia Commonwealth's Attorney, appropriate revenue officials | Virginia Code § 18.2-178, obtaining money/property/signature by false pretense with intent to defraud; § 58.1-3907, willful failure to collect/account for specified local taxes and specified falsification of transaction records. | The obtaining transaction, false statement, intent, locality, occupancy receipts and tax ledger. Lodging-tax authority does not automatically establish a property-assessment offense. [D19–D20] |
| District of Columbia Attorney General, appropriate criminal prosecutor | D.C. Code §§ 28-3904, 28-3909, consumer practices and public civil remedies; § 22-3221, fraud. Distinguish civil OAG authority from the allocation of criminal prosecution. | Consumer/merchant relationship, District connection, scheme and intent, representations and resulting property effects. Presidential clemency treatment must be assessed separately from state offenses. [D01, D21–D22] |
| Nevada Attorney General, county district attorney, insurance/consumer regulators | NRS 205.377, specified enterprise/occupational fraud; NRS 686A.2815, insurance-fraud definition, with the relevant operative offense; Chapter 598 for applicable deceptive trade practices. | Each transaction, material representation/omission, knowing fraudulent intent, affected persons, insurance context and Nevada activity. Check statutory thresholds and correct charging subsection. [D23–D25] |
| Illinois Attorney General, county State's Attorney, relevant regulators | Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/2 and /7, prohibited trade practices and public enforcement remedies. | Illinois-linked business activity, statements/omissions, audience, transaction records and harmed consumers. Public enforcement and private damages have different elements; do not borrow one standing test for the other. [D26] |
2.1 New York: use the correct theory
Civil Martin Act proceedings and Executive Law § 63(12) claims do not ordinarily require the common-law combination of scienter and individual reliance. *People v. Greenberg*, 95 A.D.3d 474 (1st Department 2012), expressly distinguishes the civil theory. The criminal provisions are different: General Business Law § 352-c(5) and (6) expressly include intent-based requirements. “No scienter required” must never appear as an undifferentiated description of all Martin Act crimes. A referral should name the civil or criminal subsection and map each element separately. [D04–D06]
Enterprise corruption is not a label for any complicated group of companies. Penal Law § 460.20 incorporates a defined pattern and participation requirements. The analysis must connect the defendant's knowledge and intentional role to qualifying acts; it cannot substitute a network diagram or repeated payments for statutory proof. The state must also establish territorial jurisdiction, followed by the correct county's venue. New York bank records may be important evidence even where the underlying conduct is chargeable elsewhere. The location of the evidence custodian and the location of the crime are distinct questions. [D07–D09]
Routing a dollar payment through a New York clearing channel therefore produces two research tasks. First, obtain lawful records identifying sender, beneficiary, intermediaries, instructions and account ownership. Second, identify which alleged act, legally significant result, complicity conduct, or statutory effect supplies New York jurisdiction. The packet must record “nexus unestablished” where only transit is known. An analyst may not fill this gap with a presumption that all dollar transactions are New York crimes.
2.2 Delaware: separate entity remedies from personal liability
Section 284 authorizes an Attorney General complaint in Chancery to seek corporate charter forfeiture for specified corporate misuse, abuse or nonuse, subject to its text. Section 18-112 provides the separate domestic LLC cancellation mechanism. Neither supplies a universal offense of “fraudulent incorporation.” A false filing allegation requires identification of the filing, signer, representation, applicable filing law and mental state. Veil piercing is a distinct equitable analysis, not a consequence automatically triggered by Delaware registration, a shell-company descriptor, a shared registered agent, or an unfavorable investigative finding. [D10–D11]
The corporate dossier should distinguish the contracting entity, each parent and subsidiary, managers, beneficial owners, registered agent, service provider and human decision-maker. Preserve entity boundaries in the graph until evidence supports combining them. A registered agent may have only formation and service records. A cancellation or receivership request must account for creditor and innocent-member interests and the court's remedial judgment. It must never be threatened by congressional staff as a means of forcing a witness to surrender constitutional rights.
2.3 California and multistate coordination
California provides overlapping consumer, securities and licensing routes, with different decision-makers and remedies. Token labels do not settle whether a transaction is a security, money transmission or digital financial asset business activity. The work product must identify the asset rights and actual service: custody, transfer, exchange, sale, marketing or another activity. Record residents served, conduct dates, license/application status and exemptions. Do not assume that an application pending under the DFAL transition is unlawful unlicensed activity. [D12–D14]
A multistate working group should execute an office-approved information-sharing agreement identifying lead and participating offices, each legal authority, permitted uses, data categories, retention and disclosure rules, response to subpoenas or public-records requests, and withdrawal procedures. An agreement cannot expand statutory access, manufacture jurisdiction or bind a court. Congress participates only through a lawful congressional disclosure process; it is not automatically a member of a prosecutorial common-interest arrangement. Each recipient maintains its own matter-opening decision and service process.
2.4 Property, hospitality and valuation work
Create one property schedule for each parcel and operating business. Capture the legal owner, parcel identifier, assessor, tax period, valuation date, ownership percentage, debt encumbrances, appraisal assumptions and purpose, insurance limits, lender covenants, use restrictions, and hospitality licenses. A market appraisal, replacement-cost insurance estimate, book value, and assessment may legitimately differ. Compare like dates, rights, methods and purposes before treating a discrepancy as a false statement.
For licensing, identify the actual license, issuing body, operative condition, violation date, notice requirements and remedy. For taxes, identify the taxpayer, tax base, return, taxing authority, payment and intent requirement. For insurance, distinguish application, renewal and claim conduct. The matrix's authorities support targeted screening, not the proposition that every jurisdiction offers every listed remedy for every property. Referral recommendations must identify the precise local law where local licensing or occupancy ordinances supply the hook.
3. Federal constitutional and statutory limits survive referral
*Trump v. Vance*, 591 U.S. 786 (2020), rejects categorical presidential immunity from a state grand-jury subpoena for personal records and a categorical heightened-need standard. It preserves subpoena-specific objections, including improper burdens on presidential duties. It is not authority to prosecute all official presidential acts. *Trump v. United States*, 603 U.S. 593 (2024), recognizes absolute immunity for exclusive constitutional presidential functions, at least presumptive immunity for other official acts, and no immunity for unofficial acts. The application of official-act and evidentiary protections in a proposed state matter requires current, case-specific constitutional analysis. A state route cannot be sold as a way around federal constitutional immunity. [D27–D28]
Similarly, national-bank status, federal regulation, federal-officer duties and preemption require review. A state enforcement label does not immunize the process from federal limits. For national banks, 12 U.S.C. § 25b distinguishes preemption and visitorial-powers questions and preserves specified judicial enforcement authority. Identify whether the contemplated instrument is an administrative examination, investigative demand, judicial subpoena or filed enforcement action. Do not assume a generally valid state CID is valid against every federally chartered institution. [D29]
The Speech or Debate Clause, Article I, Section 6, Clause 1, protects legitimate legislative acts. *Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund*, 421 U.S. 491, 501–511 (1975), protects legislative investigative activity within the legitimate legislative sphere. It does not transform a public repository, journalist, outside forensic contractor, state prosecutor or every committee communication into a constitutionally protected legislative actor. OGC must review disclosure authority and potential privilege effects record by record. The preferred state evidence is often independently obtained business records and custodian testimony, reducing dependence on proof of congressional deliberations. [D30]
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) is source-sensitive. A document does not become grand-jury secret merely because an identical copy was also subpoenaed by a grand jury; but disclosure may reveal protected proceedings, identities, strategy or testimony depending on provenance and context. The hub must quarantine any material marked, described or credibly suspected as grand-jury matter. Rule 6(e)(3)(E)(iv) permits specified court-authorized disclosure at the government's request to appropriate state or other officials for enforcing the relevant criminal law. It is not a general congressional permission to transmit grand-jury material. The committee must obtain a valid legal basis or exclude it. State grand-jury secrecy must be analyzed under that state's law, separately. [D31]
Congressional testimony compelled under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6005 presents another barrier. The use and derivative-use restriction reaches criminal use against the immunized witness; moving the transcript to a state office does not remove it. Under *Kastigar v. United States*, 406 U.S. 441, 460–462 (1972), a later prosecution must establish legitimate independent sources. Prevent exposure before it occurs: mark immunity before ingestion, preserve pre-existing evidence snapshots, use a receiving-office-approved screening team, log exposure and segregate the trial team. A “clean-team” label alone proves nothing. State law may offer broader protection: New York CPL §§ 50.10 and 190.40 include transactional immunity rules for grand-jury witnesses, subject to exceptions and waiver procedures. State counsel must approve witness sequencing. [D32–D36]
D.C. consumer investigations add a specific civil-to-criminal restriction. D.C. Code § 28-3910(a)(3) restricts admission, in later criminal proceedings against the provider, of information obtained under that investigative section, with a specified exception for sworn statements constituting the basis of a perjury prosecution. The referral team must identify this acquisition route before routing civil investigative material to a criminal team. A civil production cannot be treated as unrestricted criminal evidence merely because it was lawfully obtained. [D37]
4. The twelve-step referral workflow
- Open an authorized legislative matter. Record the committee resolution, jurisdiction, legislative questions, responsible counsel and evidence sought. Maintain a separately approved public-research matter identifier for citizen submissions. Do not ask a state office to act solely to advance a congressional political objective.
- Triage immediate preservation needs. Record concrete deletion schedules, expiring retention periods or asset movements. An urgent flag accelerates counsel review; it is not authority for the hub to freeze property. The receiving office must select its own preservation request, subpoena or judicial relief and meet the applicable standard.
- Prove source and lawful acquisition. Identify every document's originating custodian, acquisition process, production date, original filename, hash and restrictions. A lawful original production does not establish lawful onward disclosure.
- Construct the element-and-nexus map. For each proposed state theory, list the exact subsection, element, territorial fact, venue, evidence supporting it, contrary evidence and remaining gap. Distinguish allegation, observation, inference and legal conclusion.
- Classify before copying. Place records in public, ordinary nonpublic, tax-restricted, SAR/BSA-restricted, grand-jury, immunity/taint, classified, protective-order or privilege-review compartments. Multiple tags may apply. Restrictive tags prevail until counsel resolves them.
- Perform disclosure and taint review. OGC and source-owning committee counsel identify the actual authority for transmission, restrictions, required consent/order and effects on legislative privilege. Seek receiving-office screening instructions without revealing restricted substance. Exclude anything lacking authorization.
- Create an independent-source plan. For each critical proposition, identify a public record, business custodian, unexposed witness or other independently available route. Do not disguise a restricted lead as a public-source discovery. Log what the prosecutor knew and when.
- Prepare the dossier. Include the transmittal, neutral factual narrative, jurisdiction/element map, evidence manifest, methodology, exculpatory material, restrictions log and independent-source schedule. Appendix D supplies the operational instrument.
- Obtain actual approvals. Record the committee's disclosure decision under then-effective rules, OGC review, privacy review and custodian attestation. The model rule appendix proposes procedures; until adopted it grants no authority. House rules cannot override a federal statute or court order.
- Transfer through an approved channel. Confirm the recipient and intake purpose through an official channel. Encrypt approved records, send credentials separately, hash the transfer package and log the recipient's acknowledgement. Keep protected evidence in approved channels.
- Let the recipient decide. Request acknowledgement of custody and any applicable preservation needs. Do not demand charges, an interview strategy, an immunity concession or disclosure of a state grand jury's work. Log rejection or redirection without treating it as obstruction.
- Maintain corrections and review. Send material corrections and exculpatory developments promptly through the same authorized channel. Preserve prior versions and dissemination history. Publish only an approved public account identifying the distinction between referral, investigation, charge and adjudication.
5. Parallel lawful process and voluntary cooperation
Congress and a state office may pursue overlapping facts where each has its own valid purpose and authority. The liaison should maintain a deconfliction calendar describing custodians and preservation needs at the level lawfully shareable, while keeping prosecutorial strategy and grand-jury information restricted. A state CID requires the specific state's statutory authority, proper official, substantive scope, service and judicial enforcement route; “CID” is not a universal instrument. Grand-jury subpoenas belong to the authorized criminal process. Private researchers cannot issue either.
Witness cooperation must be voluntary or obtained through valid compulsory process with rights respected. Congressional investigators cannot promise state nonprosecution, immunity, a plea disposition, licensing relief, or a particular sentence. They cannot threaten dissolution, publicity or unrelated enforcement to secure testimony. A witness who requests counsel receives an appropriate opportunity to consult counsel under the applicable process. State prosecutors negotiate their own written, authorized agreements and record scope, exclusions, truthfulness duties and consequences. Cooperation benefits and prior inconsistent statements must be preserved for later disclosure obligations.
Before any interview, record whether the witness has testified under immunity; received a proffer agreement; encountered compelled employment testimony; appeared before a grand jury; or been exposed to another witness's compelled account. Do not equate a presidential pardon with elimination of the Fifth Amendment privilege: potential state or other criminal exposure may remain. Do not represent that Congress can compel answers simply because a pardon exists. Resolve the legal basis first.
6. Acceptance and publication standards
A referral is operationally complete when the receiving office can reproduce its source trail, identify the factual gaps, screen restricted material before exposure, understand the proposed jurisdiction without adopting it, and independently obtain the evidence it needs. It is not complete merely because a narrative is persuasive or a graph is visually dense.
Any public report should distinguish a referral, an investigation, charges and a disposition. Include corrections and contrary records. The receiving office controls its official announcements.
Primary-source register
The machine-readable companion is research/delta-sources.json. Authorities below were checked on November 5, 2026. Source text and amendment dates should be revalidated before official use.
- D01: DOJ Office of the Pardon Attorney, Frequently Asked Questions, state convictions and D.C. clemency scope; U.S. Constitution, Article II, § 2, cl. 1.
- D02: *Gamble v. United States*, 587 U.S. 678 (2019), majority Parts II–IV.
- D03: N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 40.51, presidential-clemency exception.
- D04: N.Y. General Business Law § 352-c, especially subdivisions 1, 4, 5 and 6.
- D05: N.Y. Executive Law § 63, subdivisions 2, 3 and 12.
- D06: *People v. Greenberg*, 95 A.D.3d 474 (1st Department 2012), civil scienter/reliance analysis.
- D07: N.Y. Penal Law § 460.20, enterprise corruption and participation.
- D08: N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 20.20, state territorial jurisdiction.
- D09: N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 20.40, county geographical jurisdiction.
- D10: 8 Del. C. § 284, corporate charter forfeiture.
- D11: 6 Del. C. § 18-112, domestic LLC judicial cancellation.
- D12: California DOJ, Civil Fraud Laws, Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.
- D13: California DFPI, Investment and Financial Services Laws, Corporations Code § 25401.
- D14: California DFPI, Digital Financial Assets, July 1, 2026 licensing/application trigger.
- D15: Florida Statutes § 817.234 (2026), insurance fraud.
- D16: Florida Statutes § 212.085 (2026), fraudulent sales-tax exemption.
- D17: New Jersey OAG, Fraud Laws; N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4.6.
- D18: N.J.S.A. 2C:21-10, commercial bribery.
- D19: Virginia Code § 18.2-178, false pretenses.
- D20: Virginia Code § 58.1-3907, specified local taxes and transaction-record falsification.
- D21: D.C. Code § 28-3909, consumer civil enforcement, with applicability notes.
- D22: D.C. Code § 22-3221, fraud.
- D23: NRS Chapter 205, § 205.377.
- D24: NRS Chapter 686A, insurance fraud definitions and operative provisions.
- D25: NRS Chapter 598, applicable deceptive trade practices.
- D26: 815 ILCS 505/2 and /7, consumer fraud public enforcement.
- D27: *Trump v. Vance*, 591 U.S. 786 (2020), subpoena-specific constitutional review.
- D28: *Trump v. United States*, 603 U.S. 593 (2024), official/unofficial act immunity.
- D29: 12 U.S.C. § 25b, subsections (b) and (i), preemption and visitorial powers.
- D30: *Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund*, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), 501–511.
- D31: U.S. Courts, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 6(e), particularly (e)(3)(E)(iv).
- D32: 18 U.S.C. § 6002, use and derivative-use immunity.
- D33: 18 U.S.C. § 6005, congressional immunity orders.
- D34: *Kastigar v. United States*, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), 460–462.
- D35: N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 190.40, grand-jury compulsion and immunity.
- D36: N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 50.10, transactional scope of immunity.
- D37: D.C. Code § 28-3910, subsection (a)(3), later criminal-use restriction on consumer investigative information.